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In contemporary debates about causality intuitions play an important role. A typical
way of testing a proposed theory of causality is by examining to what extent it
accommodates our intuitions about causal relations in concrete cases. We have
strong intuitive ideas about what does and what does not qualify as a causal relation
when we think, for example, about flagpoles and shadows, barometers and storms,
or stones hitting windows. However, the fact that so many different, incompatible
theories of causality have been proposed shows that it is difficult, if not impossible,
to formulate a general theory that applies to all concrete cases, a single theory that
satisfies all intuitions about causality.
One might of course ask why we should want a general theory of causality. One
answer is that it can have a normative function, providing guiding principles for
scientific practice. For example, a theory of causality is indispensable when
designing experiments. If a specific theory that succeeds in this respect fails to
comply with some of our intuitions, this should not count too heavily against it.
Perhaps, a truly universal theory of causality is impossible because causality is not
just one thing but rather a ‘‘cluster concept’’, a label for a number of partly
overlapping ideas that do not share an essential core. John Losee’s book, which
summarizes 2,500 years of philosophical thinking about causality, concludes in
such a spirit. Losee presents a ‘‘flowchart’’ that should help us in assessing causal
relatedness for specific cases, distinguishing between three different domains for
which different criteria apply.
The aim of Theories of Causality is ‘‘to present theories of causality within a
historical survey that emphasizes the interrelationships between these theories and
developments in science’’ (vii). As such, the book appears to be intended for
classroom use, for example, in an undergraduate philosophy of science course.
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The material presented in the book does indeed provide a fairly complete overview of
the most important philosophical accounts of causality since Aristotle. The main
problem with this book, however, is that this historical overview is merely a long
sequence of summaries of what particular philosophers have written about causality.
What the book lacks is a coherent line of argument that relates the various theories and
structures the debate about causality. This might have been achieved by classifying the
theories in groups, or at least by clarifying their relations, similarities, and differences.
For example, in Chapter 25 David Lewis’s ‘‘counterfactual conditional view’’ is
summarized. But the INUS theory of John Mackie and the manipulability account of
James Woodward, which have been summarized in previous chapters, are also
counterfactual theories. Losee does not even mention this and does not discuss the
relation between Lewis’s theory and these or other theories at all. This applies to
almost all chapters that discuss individual theories: They are just summaries, without
an attempt to relate them to the rest of the book. Chapters typically end quite abruptly,
without concluding remarks or an evaluation of the theory discussed. In this respect,
the textbook Causation and Explanation by Stathis Psillos (2002) provides much
more insight, although it spends fewer pages on the topic of causality.
The book is divided into four parts. The first part reviews, in nine very short
chapters, philosophical thinking about causality until 1900. First, there is a less than
four-page chapter on Aristotle, then three pages on medieval science (with some
tables that are not clearly explained), a chapter of less than three pages on Francis
Bacon, and so on. A three-page chapter contains a very short discussion of Kant’s
account causality, with an unclear final paragraph. All in all, it would have been
much better if these chapters had been integrated in one or two longer chapters,
exposing the continuity of the debate.
Hume’s influential ‘‘regularity theory’’ lies at the basis of most early-twentieth-
century discussions of causality and inspired the views of C. S. Peirce, Karl Pearson,
Bertrand Russell, Norman Campbell, Moritz Schlick, and Henry Margenau,
discussed in part II. Once again, it would have been preferable if the short chapters
had been integrated into a cohesive story, showing the context of and relation
between the various views. For example, Chapter 11 discusses Karl Pearson’s view
in less than two pages. The reader wants to know—but does not learn—who Karl
Pearson was and why his view is important. In sum, the historical context that this
book aspires to give is lacking. The chapter ends with a discussion of Pearson’s
instrumentalism, quoting a review of Pearson’s book by Peirce, which does not
mention causality at all. Instead of this, this reader would have preferred a
comparison between Pearson’s theory of causality and that of Peirce (which is the
topic of Chapter 10).
Part III deals exclusively with causality in quantum mechanics. This is legitimate
given that the book focuses on physical causation, for which quantum theory is highly
relevant. Indeed, quantum theory was the first truly acausal theory in physics and this
generated heated debates in the early twentieth century. Historian of science Paul
Forman (1971) has suggested that the anti-intellectual climate in the Weimar Republic
of the 1920s was responsible for an aversion against causality and induced physicists to
develop acausal theories in atomic physics. Despite its historical orientation, Losee’s
book does not embed the theories in their historical context, however. Instead, part III
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begins with a relatively long exposition of quantum theory without explicit mention of
causality, and subsequently presents a summary of Bohr’s philosophy of comple-
mentarity including his analysis of causality. Chapter 15, entitled ‘‘Causality and the
three levels of language in quantum mechanics,’’ expands on the implications of
complementarity for causality. Unfortunately, Losee does not explicitly state which
‘‘three levels of language’’ the title refers to. The final chapter of Part III deals with
Philipp Frank’s views on causality. Surprisingly, there is no explicit reference to
quantum mechanics in this chapter. This is strange, not only because quantum
mechanics is the central theme of Part III, but also because Frank actually wrote
extensively on causality in relation to quantum theory. Thus, his important 1932 book
The Law of Causality and Its Limits contains a separate chapter on this topic. However,
Losee’s account of Frank’s views is based on passages from his 1957 introductory
book Philosophy of Science—The Link between Science and Philosophy—and does
not mention the 1932 monograph.
Part IV discusses theories that have been advanced as alternatives to the
regularity view of causation. Among these are Curt Ducasse’s theory of singular
causation, the INUS theory of John Mackie, probabilistic theories of causality,
Wesley Salmon’s process theory, Phil Dowe’s conserved quantity theory, David
Fair’s account of causality as energy or momentum transfer, theories of causes as
powers (Rom Harre´, Nancy Cartwright), manipulability theories (G. H. von Wright,
Peter Menzies & Huw Price, Judea Pearl, James Woodward), and finally, David
Lewis’s counterfactual view. Losee’s discussions of these theories are more detailed
than in Parts I and II, and they are generally clear and contain helpful examples. But
these chapters also lack conclusions or comparative evaluations. For example, the
chapter on manipulability theories discusses four different theories but makes no
attempt at a comparative evaluation. Similarly, the chapter on causes as powers does
not compare the views of Harre´ and Cartwright and neither does it relate these views
to the material in the rest of the book. Finally, the chapter on Lewis ends with an
odd paragraph on forces as causes that does not seem relevant to Lewis’s theory
at all.
The last three chapters of Part IV contain a rather unsystematic and uneven
evaluation of many (but not all) of the previously discussed theories of causality. (It is
strange that these chapters are in Part IV: They belong to the conclusions.) The
evaluation results in a table listing the limitations of several criteria for causal status
(175). To me, it seems that the manipulability theory comes out as the winner. As
counterexamples to it, Losee only mentions large-scale physical processes, such as
plate-tectonic effects, because classifying these as causal on the manipulability
criterion would require ‘‘wild extrapolations from human practice’’ (175). But
Woodward (2003, 127–33) defines ‘‘intervention’’—the core notion of his manipu-
lability theory—in a way that is completely independent of what humans can do. For
some reason, however, Losee does not regard the manipulability theory as a serious
contender. Instead, he investigates the prospects of a ‘‘disjunctive criterion’’ on which
causality is either energy/momentum transfer or counterfactual dependence. He
seems to favor the former criterion for ‘‘ordinary’’ physical causation and invokes the
latter for cases of causal relatedness in which there is no energy or momentum transfer
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involved, like omission or prevention. This is a dubious choice, however: The energy/
momentum transfer criterion has been generally rejected as untenable, even in the
domain of physics; see e.g. Dieks (1981) and Psillos (2002, 122). To be sure, Losee
admits that energy/momentum transfer fails as a criterion for causality in the quantum
domain and observes that a requirement of spatiotemporal continuity is problematic
both in quantum and in classical physics (191–194). Surprisingly, however, he does
not reject the energy/momentum transfer criterion. Because the disjunctive criterion
appears problematic, Losee advances an alternative ‘‘flow chart for assessing causal
relatedness’’ (199), which invokes the inferability criterion for quantum cases, the
counterfactual dependency criterion for cases of omission, prevention or disconnec-
tion, and the energy/momentum transfer criterion for the remaining cases. It remains
unclear why, given the problems with the latter criterion, Losee clings to it and does
not include the much more promising manipulability criterion in his flowchart.
Moreover, invoking inferability (which Losee strongly criticized on pp. 173–174) for
quantum cases is an unacceptable ad hoc move. In sum, the final proposal appears
arbitrary and unconvincing.
Theories of Causality could have been a useful introductory textbook. But both
the author and the publisher should have spent much more time and effort on it. In
its present form, it looks like a first draft of a manuscript or a course syllabus. While
the book contains useful material, this should have been much better organized,
to achieve a coherent account of the debate on causality instead of a long series of
summaries. Moreover, these summaries are often unsystematic and uneven, and
Losee’s concluding assessment of them is unconvincing. Finally, the book contains
many small mistakes and is sloppily edited. For example, in the formula on p. 64,
the symbols are not explained and the minus sign should be a plus sign; years of
birth and death are provided for some of historical figures but not for all; Helen
Beebee’s name is misspelled as ‘‘Beebe’’ (166–167); and bibliographical data in the
endnotes are often incomplete (e.g., on p. 167).
A final remark: Losee writes that he focuses on physical causation, not on mental
causation (viii). But this distinction does not exhaust possible types of causality:
The social, human, and engineering sciences are full of causal reasoning that does
not fit either of these categories. Moreover, several examples in the book are not
about physical causation, for example, those involving the notions of responsibility
and guilt (on p. 137 and pp. 185–86).
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